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Economic  Perceptions and Agricultural
Policy  Preferences
Jayachandran N. Variyam and Jeffrey L. Jordan
Previous research indicates that policy perceptions  are important in explaining
individual preferences for government expenditures. In this article we study
agricultural policy  preferences using national survey data containing several  policy
perception measurements.  A model linking preferences to perceptions  through an
underlying unobservable variable  is estimated and assessed using the bootstrap. The
perception that farmers receive  too much government assistance  is dominant,  affecting
preferences negatively.  Perceptions concerning the importance of agriculture  to the
economy, financial stress and profitability,  and farming as an occupation  are also
important.  Some selective  preference for family farm support is indicated  with
implications  for efforts to promote such support.
Key words: bootstrap method, reduced-rank  regression.
During the 1980s, the U.S. agricultural sector
underwent an economic crisis to a degree not
experienced  since  the Great Depression.  The
sector was  plagued  by record  levels  of debt,
rapidly  declining  asset  values,  and  an  accel-
erated rate of farm failures (Melichar).  An ex-
tensive literature examines the causes, conse-
quences, and policy implications of this event
(e.g., Murdock and Leistritz; McKinzie, Baker,
and Tyner).  While there is general  agreement
that  policies  should  be  designed  to  ease  the
burden of transition to a more efficient sector,
substantial disagreement  on the nature of spe-
cific  policies  remains  (Dobson;  Calomiris,
Hubbard, and Stock).
The cost of U.S. farm programs rose rapidly
in the mid-eighties,  and although the cost has
fallen in recent years, much of the structure of
the farm programs remains unchanged.  Since
protective measures represent significant costs
to consumers and taxpayers, it is of interest to
examine  public  support  for  the  programs.
While surveys indicate public support for pol-
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icies to protect agriculture,  opposition may in-
crease  when  costs  of protection  are  revealed
(Dobson; Rausser and Irwin).
The  objective of this  article  is to examine
how public perceptions  of farming  and  farm
policies influence  preferences for government
involvement. The detractors of farm subsidies
argue that disproportionate amounts of federal
aid have been channeled  to large farms with
relatively stable financial conditions rather than
to  financially  stressed  small farms  (Kramer).
Voter perceptions of such "policy failures" can
affect  political  support  for  farm  programs.
Supporters of farm programs point to the so-
cial costs of financial stress, the disappearance
of small  farms,  and  the implications  for the
future structure of the agricultural sector (e.g.,
Comstock).  If such  costs  are  not  taken  into
account due to information problems, public
support for the programs  may decline.  Public
support or  opposition  may be especially  im-
portant at a time of rising budgetary pressures.
A better understanding of these issues can be
obtained by examining  how individual judg-
ments and perceptions  of the policy environ-
ment affect preferences for farm support.
Background, Model,  and Methods
Variables capturing  attitudes and perceptions
are  increasingly  being used  in the  economic
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analysis of consumer choice for private goods
(e.g.,  Train,  McFadden,  and  Goett),  prefer-
ences for various government expenditure cat-
egories (e.g., Lankford),  as well as business and
farmer decision making (e.g., Nitsche and Po-
ser; Gould, Saupe, and Klemme). This is par-
ticularly  relevant with regard  to government
spending  since  perceptions  indicate  how in-
formed the citizens  are about various aspects
of the policies under consideration.  As Fisher
points out, to the extent that individual  per-
ceptions govern behavioral responses to taxes
and expenditures, public perceptions would be
at  least  as important  as  predictions  derived
from economic theory.
Empirical choice behavior models are often
estimated under the assumption  that citizens
have complete knowledge of benefits and costs
associated  with  various  public  expenditure
categories.  However, as Lankford notes, a de-
cision-making  environment  with  incomplete
or incorrect information  is more likely to  re-
flect reality. This is borne out by studies which
show that tax and fiscal  knowledge of citizens
may be limited (e.g., Lewis and Cullis). In such
an environment, perceptions about the impact
and efficacy of government policies in relation
to their stated objectives,  and their perceived
costs  and benefits,  are likely to be  significant
determinants  of preferences  for these policies.
For instance, Lankford found that beliefs about
the effectiveness of public expenditures in im-
proving education quality, and about whether
funds are spent wisely, had  an important im-
pact on citizens' preferences for education ex-
penditures.  In  a  different  context,  Gould,
Saupe,  and  Klemme found the perception  of
soil  erosion to be  an important  factor  in the
adoption  of conservation  tillage  by  farmers.
This led them to recommend  an information
gathering  and  dissemination  system  to  pro-
mote adoption.
In the-model  considered  here,  perceptions
are assumed to be generated from information
about the issues and objectives driving the pol-
icy  process.  A  similar  approach  to informa-
tional  impacts  on  perception  formation  un-
derlies  studies  on  environmental  risk
perceptions  (e.g.,  Smith  and  Johnson)  and
product quality perceptions in marketing (e.g.,
Bagozzi). The perceptual variates act as inter-
vening variables that reflect an individual's in-
terpretation  of the decision-making  environ-
ment (Nitsche and Poser). As Graziano (p. 804)
argues, the internal representations that an in-
dividual's cognitive apparatus builds from in-
formation  are likely to be more important to
the policy process than the information itself.
The farm crisis of the 1980s generated con-
siderable public discussion on the effectiveness
and the future direction of  farm policies. Much
of the debate focused on the merits of govern-
ment protection for agriculture and policies to
preserve  the  family  farm  (e.g.,  Comstock;
Tweeten).  The  data  used  in this  study were
collected  toward  the end of the crisis  period
and, therefore,  should capture  public percep-
tions of the costs and merits of the policies.
A complete behavioral  model of preference
determination  will involve relationships  cap-
turing  perception  formation  including  infor-
mation  costs  and  socioeconomic  factors  af-
fecting both perceptions  and preferences.  The
present model can be considered as a reduced-
form relationship  that predicts preferences  as
a function of perceptions.  Such  a framework
is widely used in marketing studies where per-
ceptions  of  product  attributes,  as  affected
through advertisements, are linked to consum-
er preferences  and buying intentions (e.g.,  Ba-
gozzi).  Similarly,  in business  survey  studies,
market  perceptions  are  related  to  the firm's
production  plans  (e.g.,  Carlson  and  Dunkel-
berg).
Preference  measurement  in  this  study  is
based on a survey, and the stated preferences
are taken as indicators of actual choice similar
to several  other  studies  (e.g.,  Hewitt).  While
survey  responses  are  prone  to  measurement
errors, the accuracy of this approximation  can
be increased by the use of multiple questions
to measure preferences (Kalton and Schuman).
Suppose y, is a (p x  1) vector of preference
measurements  and xi is  a  (q  x  1) vector  of
perception measurements  for the ith individ-
ual. Following the perception-preference  link-
age model, let yi depend on xi linearly:
(1) i = Cxi + e,  i = 1, 2,..., N,
where yi and xi have been transformed to have
zero  mean and unit variance,  C is a (p  x  q)
coefficient matrix, and ei is a (p x  1) vector of
i.i.d. error terms uncorrelated with xi and hav-
ing mean zero and covariance matrix 2ee. When
C has full  rank,  (1) is the usual  multiple re-
gression model. However, when the variables
are indicators of related concepts as in the pres-
ent case, one may suspect an underlying struc-
ture relating  these  variables.  Specifically,  the
observed indicators may be related by a small
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number of underlying unobservables so that C
has  a  reduced  rank.  For  example,  Train,
McFadden,  and Goett used factor analysis  to
recover  variates  underlying  attitudinal  mea-
surements  to predict consumer choice  among
optimal rate schedules offered by a public util-
ity. In the present case, the objective  is to ex-
tract  the perception  structure  in xi that best
predicts  multiple preference measurements in
Yi.
Suppose there exist r < min(p, q) perceptual
variates formed as a linear combination  of xi
that  best predict  Yi.  This implies  a rank  re-
striction on  C so that C may be written  as C
= AB  where A  and B  are rank  r matrices  of
order (p  x  r) and (r x  q), respectively.  Thus,
(1)  becomes
(2) yi = A(Bx,)  + ei,
where Bx, gives the (r x  1)  vector of  perceptual
variates.  Matrix B holds the loadings  of x, on
the perceptual variates and matrix A  contains
the regression  coefficients  of y, on the percep-
tual variates. Model  (2) is called the reduced-
rank regression  model and its estimation has
been considered by Izenman.
Collecting measurements for the N individ-
uals in matrix form, equation (2) may be writ-
ten as
Y= A(BX)  + e,
where  Y= (y1,  2, ... ,  N),  X= (x, x2,..*.
XN)  and e = (e1,  e2, ... , eN),  respectively.  The
problem then is to estimate A and B that min-
imizes
tr[E{r/(Y - ABX)(Y  - ABX)'r
2}],
where tr stands for trace, E is the expectations
operator, and r is a positive definite symmetric




(3b)  B= [  , ... ,  'rx - 1,
where 2y  = E(YX'),  xx  = E(XX'),  and  Vj  is
the jth  eigenvector  corresponding  to  the jth
largest  eigenvalue,  X
2 ,  of  the  matrix
r'YX 
1 xx-  I  , j  = 1,  ... ,  r. For standard-
ized variables, the choice  for r  is I, a (p  x  p)
identity matrix (Israels).  Solution  (3) ensures
the uniqueness of the parameters by the nor-
malization  A'TA  = I and B22XB'  = A2 where
A2 is a (p x p) diagonal matrix containing the
eigenvalues, XJ, arranged in descending order. 1
Versions  of the  reduced-rank  model  have
been  previously  employed,  for  example,  by
Whittle  and  Adelman  to  study  agrarian  de-
velopment  and  by Avery  to study monetary
policy.  Discussion  of several  related  models
can be found in Aigner and  Goldberger.2
The  stability  of parameter  estimates  from
(3) can be assessed using the bootstrap method
(Efron and  Tibshirani).3 The  method  is  im-
plemented by sampling with replacement from
the original  sample to  obtain  b independent
bootstrap samples.  The size of each bootstrap
sample equals N, the original sample size. Since
the perception variables  are as random as the
preference  variables, resampling  involves the
entire  set (Y',  X').  The required  statistics are
calculated  from  each  sample  so  that  b  esti-
mates of each statistic are  obtained. For suf-
ficiently large b, the resulting bootstrap distri-
bution of the estimates approximates the true
but unknown distribution of the statistic. The
mean and the standard deviation of the boot-
strap  distribution can be used to estimate the
bias and the standard  error of the parameter
estimates.
I The estimation is carried out by replacing the population mo-
ments by their empirical counterparts.  The measurement  scale of
the variables is an issue in the present case where the variables are
measured on a  1-5 scale. Given the large number of variables and
the  nonlinearity  of the  model,  taking the  ordinal  nature  of the
variables  explicitly  into account  is  difficult.  However,  there  are
major reasons  why treating  the variables  as continuous  may not
have much empirical  effect. In previous single-equation  analyses,
estimates obtained using a qualitative choice framework were found
to be similar to those based on  integer scores. Further,  estimates
from correlation matrices calculated using an ordinal probit frame-
work  were  found  to be  close to  the  estimates  from  correlation
matrices  based on  integer scores  (see Olsson for  a  discussion  of
this methodology).
2 There is an extensive literature  on reduced-rank regression  in
psychometrics  under  the rubric redundancy  analysis  (see Israels,
Chapter  8, for  a review). Here,  the property  of reduced-rank re-
gression  in forming orthogonal  lower dimensional variates  from
the  X variables  that maximizes the  mean-squared  multiple  cor-
relation  of the  Y variables  (the so called "redundancy index") is
stressed so as to distinguish it from canonical correlation analysis.
Canonical correlation analysis forms linear combinations of the Y
and X variables that are maximally  correlated without seeking to
maximize the predictability of the  Y set by the X set. The former
property is important in the present case where the focus is on the
perception  structure that best  predicts multiple  preference  mea-
surements.
3 Conditional  on the  regressors  being  fixed,  standard errors  of
the estimates can be obtained under the assumption of normally
distributed errors (Israels,  pp. 227-79). Since both the preference
and perception  variables are survey responses measured on a 1-5
scale, this assumption seems untenable. The nonparametric boot-
strap method is employed  to avoid this assumption.
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Data and Variables
This study  uses data from a nationwide mail
survey conducted in 1986 to determine public
views of changes taking place in the structure
of U.S.  agriculture.  Pretested  questionnaires
containing over  150 questions including those
to determine support for farmers and farm is-
sues were mailed to a stratified sample of 9,250
persons representing the U.S. population. The
population from which the sample was drawn
consisted  of a  computer-merged  list  of resi-
dential  telephone subscribers and automobile
owners. In 1986 the proportions of  U.S. house-
holds with telephone  and automobile  owner-
ship were 92% and 90%, respectively (U.S. Bu-
reau of the  Census).  Thus,  the population  is
well representative  of the  households  in  the
United  States.  The  number  of usable  ques-
tionnaires returned was 3,239, giving a return
rate of 46% adjusting for incorrect  addresses
and deceased. The survey had a stratified sam-
pling design with oversampling in seven states.
All calculations were done after weighting the
observations  to restore  equal representation.
A detailed discussion on the development and
administration of the questionnaire,  data pro-
cessing, and response rate can be found in Mol-
nar.
The questions selected for analysis and their
response  patterns  are  summarized in table  1.
The  sample  size  available  after  deleting  all
missing observations  was  2,720. The respon-
dents registered their preferences and percep-
tions on a 1-5 scale ranging from strongly agree
to strongly disagree. In table 1, frequencies un-
der  scores  1 and  2  and  4  and  5 have  been
merged  to  give  "agree"  and  "disagree,"  re-
spectively. The estimation uses measurements
on the full  1-5 scale.
Part A of  table 1  lists 11 preference questions
considered  in  the  analysis.4 Overall,  the  re-
sponse  pattern  indicates  support  for govern-
ment involvement.  However,  there  is also  a
notable  diversity  in  response  pattern  across
questions.  In particular,  there is a decline  in
preference  for support  policies when  willing-
4  The distinction  between preferences and perception questions
is based on their wording and the type of information sought (see
Kalton and Schuman).  By this norm  however,  items  2 and  4 in
part A of table 1 cannot be strictly viewed as preference questions.
They are included  nevertheless due to their  explicit reference  to
preserving the family farm and the fact that they were placed near
other preference questions on the  questionnaire.  Their exclusion
did not change the results  appreciably.
ness  to pay higher prices  is mentioned.  Such
differences  have  been  noted  in  other  public
expenditure studies (Hewitt; Lewis and Cullis).
The  survey included  a wide range of ques-
tions to capture  the respondents'  policy per-
ceptions.  All perceptual  and attitudinal ques-
tions  related  to the  policy  issues  considered
here have been selected for analysis. These 26
questions are listed in part B of table 1. Broad-
ly, the questions capture economic perceptions
relating to the financial health of farms (items
1 and  2),  profitability  of farming  (items  3 to
5),  level of government  involvement  and  as-
sistance to farmers (items 6 to 10), importance
of  agriculture to the general and local economy
(items  15  to  18),  as  well as attitudes  toward
small  and  large  farms  (items  11  to  14)  and
farming as an occupation (items 19 to 26). The
structure  underlying  these  perception  vari-
ables as it relates to the preference variables is
extracted using reduced-rank regression.
Results  and Discussion
Based  on  the set  of preference  variables  in-
cluded,  three versions  of the model were  es-
timated.  For each model,  the standard  errors
of the parameter  estimates  were  obtained  by
the bootstrap method. The bootstrap was em-
ployed by drawing  300  samples,  each of size
2,720,  with  replacement  from  the  original
sample  (Efron and Tibshirani).  Parameter es-
timates  were  computed  from  each bootstrap
sample, and the mean and standard deviation
of the resulting distribution for each parameter
were  used  to  estimate  its bias  and  standard
error,  respectively.
The  main results  are presented  in tables  2
and 3.  Model (1) includes the complete set of
11  preference  variables  and  26  perception
variables  and  forms  the basis  for discussing
the major statistical results. The first empirical
question  addressed  is  the  rank  of C,  or  the
number of underlying  perceptual  variates  in
the  model.  This  is  akin  to  determining  the
number of factors  in factor  analysis,  and,  in
the absence of prior information, a frequently
employed  procedure  is to  choose  only  those
variates that explain at least l/trlyy of the total
Yvariance, trey  (Train, McFadden, and Goett,
p. 388).
The  proportion  of variance  explained  by
successive  perceptual  variates is given by the
ratio of corresponding eigenvalues to the total
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Table 1.  Summary of Responses  to Preference and Perception Questions
G  Frequency and Percent
Statement  Variable Name  Agree  Undecided  Disagree
A.  Preferences
1. The family farm must be preserved because  it is a vi-  HERITAGE
tal part of our heritage.
2.  Obtaining greater efficiency in food production is  GREFF
more important than preserving the family farm.
3.  Government should have a special policy to ensure  SPOLICY
that family  farms survive.
4.  Most consumers would be willing to have food prices  HPRICE1
raised to help preserve  the family farm.
5.  Family farms should be supported even if it means  HPRICE2
higher food prices.
6.  Government  should guarantee  a minimum  price to  MINPRICE
farmers for their products.
7.  The government should treat farms just like other  BUSINESS
businesses.
8.  Farmers should compete in a free market without  FREEMKT
government support.
9.  The government  should not be involved in agricul-  NOINVOL
ture at all.
10.  Government should help as many farmers as possi-  OWNLAND
ble to own their farmland.
11.  Government programs should help young people get  STARTFM
started in farming.
B.  Perceptions
1. Most farmers are wealthy.  WEALTHY
2.  Today, most farmers are in financial trouble.  FINTRB
3.  Most of the time, farmers make reasonable profits  PROFIT1
when they sell their products.
4.  Most profits in the food business  go to processors  PROFIT2
and distributors,  not to farmers.
5.  Most of the money consumers  spend on food goes to  PROFIT3
the farmer.
6.  Farmers get too much money from government pro-  TOOMUCH
grams.
7.  Farmers get more than their fair share  of government  SHARE
benefits.
8.  Government involvement  in agriculture  has been  GINVOL1
about right.
9.  Government involvement  in agriculture has helped  GINVOL2
consumers.
10.  Government involvement  in agriculture has hurt  GINVOL3
farmers.
11.  Most farms today are too large.  TOOLAR
12.  Large farms get too many government  benefits.  BENEFIT
13.  Small farms generally  produce better quality food  SMAFM1
products than large farms.
14.  Small farmers are farming because they failed  to de-  SMAFM2
velop or acquire  other skills.
15.  Agriculture  is the most basic occupation in our soci-  BASIC
ety, and almost all other occupations  depend on it.
16.  A depression in agriculture  is likely to cause a de-  AGDEPR
pression in the entire country.
17.  Most of the food consumed in this state is produced  STATE
outside  the state.
18.  Farming is a big source of jobs in my state.  JOBS
2,056  293  371
(75.6)  (10.8)  (13.6)
706  592  1,422
(26.0)  (21.8)  (52.3)
1,606  504  610
(59.0)  (18.5)  (22.4)
610  545  1,565
(22.4)  (20.0)  (57.5)
987  718  1,015
(36.3)  (26.4)  (37.3)
1,150  542  1,028
(42.3)  (19.9)  (37.8)
1,476  443  801
(54.3)  (16.3)  (29.4)
1,204  744  722
(44.3)  (27.4)  (28.4)
486  612  1,622
(17.9)  (22.5)  (59.6)
1,399  461  860
(51.4)  (16.9)  (31.6)
1,662  463  595
(61.1)  (17.0)  (21.9)
135  184  2,401
(5.0)  (6.8)  (88.3)
1,788  434  498
(65.7)  (16.0)  (18.3)
804  622  1,294
(29.6)  (22.9)  (47.6)
2,463  171  86
(90.6)  (6.3)  (3.2)
57  69  2,594
(2.1)  (2.5)  (95.4)
734  768  1,218
(27.0)  (28.2)  (44.8)
684  .794  1,242
(25.1)  (29.2)  (45.7)
367  1,076  1,277
(13.5)  (39.6)  (46.9)
956  945  819
(35.1)  (34.7)  (30.1)
1,177  893  650
(43.3)  (32.8)  (23.9)
510  755  1,455
(18.8)  (27.8)  (53.5)
1,292  1,023  405
(47.5)  (37.6)  (14.9)
1,063  943  714
(39.1)  (34.7)  (26.3)
238  271  2,211
(8.8)  (10.0)  (81.3)
2,128  276  316
(78.2)  (10.1)  (11.6)
1,899  460  361
(69.8)  (16.9)  (13.3)
1,332  557  831
(49.0)  (20.5)  (30.6)
1,383  408  929
(50.8)  (15.0)  (34.2)
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Table 1.  Continued
Frequency and Percent
Statement  Variable Name  Agree  Undecided  Disagree
19.  Anybody can farm, no special training  is required.  NOTRAIN  99  47  2,574
(3.6)  (1.7)  (94.6)
20.  I would be happy if my son or daughter chose  farm-  SONFM  1,012  801  970
ing as an occupation.  (37.2)  (29.4)  (33.3)
21.  Farmers complain too much about their problems.  COMPLAIN  582  490  1,648
(21.4)  (18.0)  (60.6)
22.  Farming involves understanding  and working with  NATURE  1,398  638  684
nature; therefore,  it is a much more satisfying occu-  (51.4)  (23.5)  (25.1)
pation than others.
23.  Farming should be an occupation  where farmers can  INDEP  2,115  443  162
make their economic decisions independently.  (77.8)  (16.2)  (6.0)
24.  A farmer should be proud if he can say that he owes  PROUD  2,302  184  234
money to no one.  (84.6)  (6.8)  (8.6)
25.  Farmers ought to appreciate  farming as a good way  LIFE  321  333  2,066
of life and be less concerned about their cash income.  (11.8)  (12.2)  (76.0)
26.  Farmers should raise  all of the crops and livestock  HUNGRY  1,320  618  782
possible as long as there are hungry  people.  (48.5)  (22.7)  (28.8)
Note:  Figures are based on 2,720 observations  obtained  after  deleting all observations  with  missing values.  Percentages  may not add
up to 100 because  of rounding  error.
Y variance  (i.e.,  X2/trSyy).  Since the variables
are standardized  to unit variance,  the total  Y
variance  is  11.  Table  2  shows that for model
(1),  the  first  perceptual  variate  accounts  for
20% of total  Y variance.  The contribution  of
the  second and higher variates  was  less  than
9% suggested by the l/try  criterion.  The sum
of all the eigenvalues,  trA2, is 2.89 so that the
maximum  Y variance  that can  be  explained
(i.e., trA 2/trZyy)  is 26%. Thus,  a rank-1  model
seems to provide the best fit to the data. This
conclusion  is  supported  by the bootstrap  re-
sults.
The  bootstrap  standard  error  estimates
showed that none of the parameter  estimates
for the  second  or higher perceptual  variates
were statistically significant.  Further, while for
r =  1 the parameter  estimates  were  close  to
their bootstrap  means  (bias less than  2%  for
all significant parameter estimates), for the sec-
Table 2.  A Coefficients  of Preference  Variables, Bootstrap Standard Errors, and Model Sta-
tistics
Variable  Model (1)  Model  (2)  Model (3)
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ond and higher perceptual variates the param-
eter  estimates  had  relatively  high  bias  (bias
above 25% for all parameter estimates). Thus,
useful information  in the data for the model
considered  can  be  recovered  by extracting  a
single perceptual  variate. Ignoring higher var-
iates  does not affect the interpretation  of the
rank-i  model  since  the solutions  are  nested.
This implies considerable parameter reduction
since  a full  rank  model  has 286  parameters.
With a rank of one, the number of parameters
reduces to  37.  Thus,  for each  of the  models
estimated,  tables  2  and  3 report  the  rank-i
solution.5
The B coefficients  are the loadings  of per-
ception variables on the underlying perceptual
variate,  and the A  coefficients  are the regres-
sion coefficients of each preference variable on
the perceptual variate.  The perceptual variate
itself is a priori unsigned, and its interpretation
depends on the coefficient signs as well as the
scale of the observed variables (see Avery, pp.
300-01).  The variables  are measured on a 1-
5 scale with  1 for strong agreement and  5 for
strong disagreement.  Therefore, looking at the
coefficient  signs with the scale of the variables
in mind, it can be seen that a rise in the value
of the  perceptual  variate  indicates  stronger
5 The impact of not including  individual characteristics such as
gender, age, and income in the model is a concern. These variables
would  enter a  structural  model  of preference  formation as  indi-
cators of access  to and  cost of information  and the  cost-benefit
calculations of individuals.  Since they are also likely to be corre-
lated with the perception variables, excluding them might bias the
results. Further, the bootstrap results will be erroneous  since they
are  calculated  under the  assumption  that  the  original  model  is
correctly  specified.  These issues can be examined  by considering
an augmented model where the omitted variables are added. Sup-
pose  there  are  k variables  measuring  individual  characteristics
collected in a (k x  N) matrix, Z. Adding these variables, equation
(2) may be modified and written  in matrix form,
(2')  Y= A(BX) + DZ +  u,
where D is a (p x  k) matrix of coefficients and u is a (p x N) matrix
of error terms with zero mean  and covariance  matrix  uu,.  Similar
to the treatment of individual characteristics  in other preference
studies, D can be taken to be of full rank.  Estimation of A  and B
under (2') is discussed by Goldberger (pp. 203-04). In the present
case, the procedure  involves applying the eigenvalue  decomposi-
tion suggested  by Izenman  to the partial correlations  between  Y
and  X controlling for Z. To  examine  if the  reported  results  are
affected,  equation  (2') was estimated  with  Y and X  consisting of
the 11  preference and the 26 perception variables and Z consisting
of variables measuring residential location, employment, political
preference,  frequency  of church  attendance,  gender,  race,  educa-
tion, income, farm income, age, and geographical location. Except
income and age, all the rest were dummy variables. The estimates
obtained were similar to those under model (1) in tables  2 and 3
in terms of both magnitude and sign.  In fact, the rank-1  solution
accounted for about 77% of the explained variance in Y, the same
as for the rank-1  solution for model (1).  Thus, the reported results
are robust to the exclusion  of individual-specific  characteristics.
support for government  involvement in agri-
culture. For example, the positive B coefficient
for  TOOMUCH (table  3)  indicates  that  the
value of the perceptual variate rises when there
is  greater  disagreement  with  the  view  that
farmers get too much money from government
programs.  The  negative  A  coefficient  for
SPOLICY (table 2) indicates that as the value
of the perceptual  variate rises, there is greater
preference  for special government  policies to
ensure family farm survival.  Thus, those who
do  not  perceive  government  payments  to
farmers  as  excessive  tend  to support  special
policies to protect family farms.
As can be seen from table 2, all the A coef-
ficients  are statistically  significant and of sim-
ilar magnitude indicating that the first percep-
tual variate predicts the 11 preference variables
to a relatively similar degree. This lends more
confidence to the interpretation of  results since
it is not based on response to any single pref-
erence  question.  Rather,  preferences  for gov-
ernment involvement under different contexts
are explained. The smallest coefficients are for
HPRICE  1 and GREFF, which may be due to
the difference in the wording of  these questions
(see footnote  4).
The  B coefficients  reported  in  table  3 are
grouped by the subject  classification  given in
the Data section. The  coefficients  differ  con-
siderably in size indicating the relative role of
the perception  variables  and their groupings
in predicting policy  preferences.  TOOMUCH
has the largest estimated loading and is highly
significant.  Its positive sign,  as discussed  ear-
lier, indicates that scoring high on its scale (i.e.,
tend to  disagree)  increases  the  value  of the
variate. This, in turn, implies agreement with
pro-support  statements  such  as HERITAGE
and SPOLICY (since  these  have  negative  A
coefficients)  and  disagreement  with opposing
statements  such  as  BUSINESS  and
FREEMKT (since these have positive A  coef-
ficients). Thus, the perception that farmers get
too much money from government  programs
strongly predicts opposition to government in-
volvement.
The relative  size and significance  of coeffi-
cients for SHARE, GINVOL 1, and GINVOL2
give  additional  evidence  in this  regard.  The
perception that farmers get more than their fair
share  of government  benefits  affects  prefer-
ences negatively while  the views that govern-
ment involvement  has been  about right and
that it has in fact helped the consumers have
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Table 3.  B Coefficients  of Perception Variables and Bootstrap Standard Errors
Variable  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)
No.  Name  Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE  Coefficient  SE
Financial Health and Farm Profitability
1  WEALTHY  -.028  .048  -.011  .042  -. 025  .041
2  FINTRB  -. 187*  .041  -.179*  .039  -. 091*  .035
3  PROFIT1  .068  .040  .047  .039  .052  .041
4  PROFIT2  -. 162*  .041  -. 146*  .039  -.089*  .034
5  PROFIT3  .040  .038  .000  .042  .050  .035
Level  of Government  Involvement
6  TOOMUCH  .712*  .065  .338*  .054  .637*  .055
7  SHARE  .247*  .059  .138*  .053  .210*  .054
8  GINVOL1  -. 186*  .043  -. 072  .040  -. 180*  .043
9  GINVOL2  -.209*  .045  -. 158*  .039  -.148*  .042
10  GINVOL3  .067  .044  -. 125*  .038  .200*  .039
Farm Size
11  TOOLAR  -. 076  .043  -. 104*  .040  -. 013  .037
12  BENEFIT  -.099  .051  -. 166*  .045  .008  .044
13  SMAFM1  -. 148*  .042  -. 158*  .036  -. 061  .034
14  SMAFM2  .030  .042  .048  .036  .004  .035
Importance  of Agriculture
15  BASIC  -. 041  .048  -.095*  .047  .022  .044
16  AGDEPR  -.284*  .052  -.191*  .048  -.205*  .045
17  STATE  .024  .039  .090*  .037  -. 040  .036
18  JOBS  .040  .038  .050  .037  .007  .033
Farming as an Occupation
19  NOTRAIN  .063  .038  .090*  .034  .011  .034
20  SONFM  -.114*  .043  -.085*  .038  -.074  .038
21  COMPLAIN  .246*  .052  .211*  .043  .144*  .046
22  NATURE  -. 216*  .043  -.245*  .041  -.077*  .038
23  INDEP  .167*  .045  .051  .039  .182*  .035
24  PROUD  -.019  .039  -. 025  .040  .000  .032
25  LIFE  -.014  .043  -.069  .040  .040  .039
26  HUNGRY  -. 123*  .040  -.051  .037  -. 113*  .035
Note: SE stands for standard error.  Asterisks indicate coefficient estimates are at least twice their standard errors. For definitions of the
variables,  see table 1.
a positive impact. Given that agricultural pro-
grams transfer income with costs  to consum-
ers, the  latter effect  may indicate  the lack of
visibility of the costs.
The  relatively  large  loading  for AGDEPR
shows that support is preferred by respondents
concerned about the effects of a farm crisis on
the general  economy.  This result  seems  sur-
prising given that the agricultural sector is small
relative  to the general economy. On the other
hand, coefficients for STATE and JOBS  which
measure the perceived importance  of agricul-
ture to the local  economy are not significant.
Given that stress in the agricultural sector has
a relatively greater impact on many local econ-
omies, these results seem contradictory. A pos-
sible explanation is that AGDEPR captures the
perceived effects of agriculture-related  stress at
both the local and the national levels,  as well
as more general concerns about issues such as
food security.
Among perceptions  of financial  health and
farm  profitability,  FINTRB  and  PROFIT2
have significant loadings. Thus, preference for
farm support is related to the perception that
most farmers face financial problems and that
most profits  in the food  business  go to  pro-
cessors and distributors,  not to farmers.
Among variables measuring views on farm-
ers  and  farming  as  an occupation,  SONFM,
COMPLAIN, NATURE,  INDEP, and HUN-
GRY have significant loadings on the percep-
tual variate.  The view that farmers  complain
too much predicts opposition, indicating that
the wide discussion of farm problems may be
having a negative side effect. Favorable views
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of farming indicated by agreement with a son
or  daughter in choosing  farming  as an  occu-
pation and the perception of farming as a more
satisfying occupation than others predicts sup-
port.  This,  together  with  the  significance  of
HUNGRY, indicates that preference for great-
er support may be related to the perceived need
to protect farming as a way of life. At the same
time,  the  view  that farming  should  involve
independent  economic  decisions  has  a nega-
tive impact on preferences.
With regard to farm size, the significance  of
the  coefficient  for SMAFM1  indicates  that a
favorable perception of small farms has a pos-
itive impact on preferences.  Such a favorable
perception is indicated by the view that small
farms produce  better  quality  food than  large
farms. Estimated coefficients  for TOOLAR and
BENEFIT  are not significant.  The implication
that concerns  about farm size  are not impor-
tant in  determining  preferences  is  surprising
given that diversion of benefits to large farms
is a major issue in the farm  policy debate.
A notable feature of the above results is the
differences  in  the estimated  loadings  of per-
ception  variables  within  each  subject group.
For example, under farm financial health and
profitability, only FINTRB and PROFIT2 are
significant. Among variables pertaining to farm
size,  only SMAFM1 is significant.  Part of this
could  be due  to measurement  error inherent
in surveys  where a question may convey  dif-
ferent meaning to different respondents. How-
ever, part of this could also be due to the joint
use  of variables  measuring  family  farm  sup-
port (items  1 to  5)  with variables  measuring
more  general support  for agriculture  (items 6
to  11)  as dependent variables  in model (1).  If
certain  perceived  factors  affect  family  farm
support  selectively,  these  effects  may  not be
captured  in model  (1).  To  examine  this,  the
analysis including the estimation of parameter
standard errors was repeated separately on the
two sets of variables.  The results are reported
in tables  2 and  3 under model  (2)  for family
farm  support  and model (3) for general  agri-
cultural support.
Examining the parameter estimates and their
standard  errors, it can  be seen  that many of
the results under model (1) hold under model
(2) and model (3) as well. The signs of all  sig-
nificant A  and B coefficients in model  (1)  re-
main the same in models (2) and (3). However,
table  3 shows  some striking  differences  with
respect to the loadings of perception variables
that point  to selective  preferences  for family
farm support. A notable  change is that TOO-
LAR,  BENEFIT,  and  SMAFM1  are  signifi-
cant in model  (2) but not in model  (3).  Thus,
the perception that most farms  are too  large
and that large farms get too many benefits trig-
gers support for family farms but not for gen-
eral agriculture.  In addition,  favorable views
of small farms also have the same effect. These
results indicate that concerns about the trend
toward larger farms is an important factor de-
termining a respondent's  preference  for poli-
cies specifically aimed at protecting the family
farms. Respondents  favoring protection  seem
to be identifying family farms with small farms.
The  coefficients  for  TOOMUCH  and
SHARE are larger within model (3) compared
to model (2). Thus, the perception that farmers
receive too much government assistance exerts
a relatively greater  negative  effect  on  prefer-
ences for general government  support than on
the support for family farms. As a group, con-
cerns about the level  of government involve-
ment  continue  to  exert  the  largest  effect  on
policy preferences in models  (2) and (3),  as in
model (1).
Interestingly,  GINVOL3  which  was  insig-
nificant  in model  (1),  is  significant  in model
(2) and model (3) but with opposite signs. Thus,
the view that government involvement in ag-
riculture has hurt farmers has a positive effect
on preferences for family farm  support but a
negative effect on preferences for more general
agricultural support. This result could arise due
to the belief that past government  programs
have not been properly targeted to help family
farms.
The  significance  and  the  relatively  larger
loading  for  NOTRAIN  and  COMPLAIN  in
model (2) could be an indication that the pub-
licity about the plight of the family farms may
be perceived negatively, causing some erosion
in  support.  Another  notable  result  is  that
STATE has a significant positive coefficient in
model  (2)  implying  that respondents  of pre-
dominantly nonagricultural  states are relative-
ly less supportive of special policies to protect
family farms.
Conclusions
Previous  research has  indicated that percep-
tions and  attitudes  have  an important  influ-
ence on individual preferences for various gov-
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ernment  policies.  Such  variables  capture
individual judgments about the costs and ben-
efits of the policies and hence enter into a pref-
erence  formation  model.  In this  article,  the
question of agricultural policy preferences was
examined using national survey data.
To uncover  the structure  of perceptions  as
predictors of  policy preferences, a reduced-rank
regression  approach  was  employed.  The  sta-
bility of the estimated parameters was studied
using the bootstrap  method.  A  single,  statis-
tically  stable,  perceptual  variate  was  uncov-
ered that,  depending  on the  set of preference
variables  considered,  accounted  for  between
20% to 25% of the total variance in the stated
preferences.
The  dominant perception,  affecting  prefer-
ences negatively, was the view that farmers get
too  much  money  and  a  larger  than  desired
share  from  government  programs.  Favorable
views of farming  as an occupation  as  well  as
the perception of financial  stress also had  sig-
nificant influence  on preferences.  While  such
perceptions  continued  to  dominate  models
where questions  on family  farm support  and
general agricultural support were analyzed sep-
arately,  the  effect  was  relatively  weaker  on
preferences for family farm support especially
with respect  to the perceptions  on the  exces-
siveness of government payments.  This could
be an  indication that policy costs  are given  a
lesser weight when the objective is to save the
family farm. Two additional results also point
to a selective  preference  for family farm sup-
port. First, the perception that government in-
volvement has hurt farmers had a positive im-
pact  on  family  farm  support  but a  negative
impact  on more general government  support.
This latter effect could arise due to the notion
that many of the problems  are the product of
improper distribution of government benefits.
Second,  favorable  views  of small  farms  and
concern about too many large farms had a pos-
itive  impact  on  preferences  for  family  farm
support  but not on  general  agricultural  sup-
port.
The results have implications for groups and
policy advocates interested in protecting small
and family farms from financial stress and fail-
ure. To the extent that such protection requires
subsidies and income transfer policies,  public
support is essential, especially in an era of high
budget  deficits.  By  supplying  accurate  infor-
mation about the social costs of financial stress
and the disappearance of small farms, and the
past benefits from government assistance, wid-
er  support  for the policies  can be  promoted.
This may be important since there is evidence
that  some of the existing support  may be be-
cause the policy costs are not transparent.
As with all survey-based  studies it is essen-
tial to be cautious in generalizing these results
beyond  the  sample.  The  trend  of the results
however  seems to  confirm  some  of the  gen-
eralizations  concerning  public  support  made
in the farm policy literature.  Thus, while the
concern about an unfair share of government
assistance going to agriculture is the major fac-
tor triggering opposition, concerns about larger
farm  size  and  a  perceived  need  to preserve
family farming as  a way of life promote  sup-
port. At the same time, some surprising results
are revealed,  such as the lack of influence  of
concerns about farm size and the importance
of agriculture  to the local  economy,  on pref-
erences for general agricultural support.  Over-
all, the results indicate that policies that better
target  assistance  to  small  and  financially
stressed family farms are likely to receive wid-
er public  support.  Factors  such  as  environ-
mental  protection  and  food safety  could  not
be considered in this study but are likely to be
important in the future.
Finally,  on  a methodological  note,  the re-
sults  show  the need for  using multiple  mea-
surements in studies using preference and per-
ception variables.  In situations where multiple
measurements  are  available,  the study shows
how the unobservable variable framework can
be effectively utilized for parsimonious param-
etrization  and  clear interpretation  of the un-
derlying  relationships.
[Received March 1990; final revision
received July 1991.]
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